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随着资本市场中机构投资者同时持股同行业多家企业现象日益普遍，共同机构投资者不仅成为政府部门关注的焦点，也成为近年来公司金融研究的热点。文章围绕共同机构投资者“动因→路径→结果”的研究脉络，首先，梳理共同机构投资者协调企业行为的动因；其次，从表现形式和具体途径归纳共同机构投资者的协调路径；最后，从“协同网络”和“合谋网络”总结共同机构投资者的协调结果。在此基础上，文章进一步展望共同机构投资者未来可能的研究方向，以期为推动国内学术界从共同机构投资者视角探讨企业间联动效应和企业内公司治理问题提供支持，并为政府部门制定相关政策提供借鉴。
Abstract：As institutional investors in the capital market increasingly hold shares across multiple companies within the same industry, these common institutional investors have emerged as a significant focus of government attention and a prominent subject of inquiry in contemporary corporate finance research. The essay follows the research framework of "Motivation→Pathway→Outcome" concerning common institutional investors. Firstly, it examines the underlying motivations that drive these investors to coordinate corporate behavior. Secondly, it summarizes the pathways of coordination, categorizing them by their forms and specific methodologies. Lastly, the essay concludes by evaluating the outcomes of such coordination, analyzed through the dual perspectives of "collaborative networks" and "collusive networks". Building upon this, the essay further explores potential future research directions for future research concerning common institutional investors. The aim is to support the domestic academic community in examining the inter-company linkage effects and corporate governance issues from the perspective of common institutional investors.Furthermore, the study seeks to offer valuable insights for government authorities in the formulation of relevant policies.
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（1）根据股东在上市公司的影响力，国内外已有研究基本将共同机构投资者界定为同时持有同行业多家企业5%以上股份的机构投资者。
（2）需要说明的是，虽然“Common Ownership”“Overlapping Ownership”“Common Shareholders”以及“共同大股东”“连锁股东”“共同股东”“共同所有权”等与“共同机构投资者”在内容上存在交叉，但为聚焦研究问题，未将相关文献纳入本文研究范围。
基本信息:
DOI：10.19629/j.cnki.34-1014/f.240712013
中图分类号:F832.51
引用信息:
[1]孙帆,杜勇,王晓萱.共同机构投资者的研究脉络及其展望[J].华东经济管理,2025,39(03):83-91.DOI:10.19629/j.cnki.34-1014/f.240712013.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金面上项目“机构共同持股下的实体企业影子银行化同群效应：表征识别、驱动机理与经济后果”（72072146）; 重庆市研究生科研创新项目“机构投资者委派董事对企业ESG表现的影响研究”（CYB240076）